Paraconsistency and Topological Semantics

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Outlook of the Talk

- What is Paraconsistency?
- Topological Semantics
- Paraconsistency and Topology
- Conclusion

Paraconsistency

The well-studied notion of deductive explosion describes the situation where any formula can be deduced from an inconsistent set of formulae, i.e. for all formulae φ and ψ, we have $\{\varphi, \neg\varphi\} \vdash \psi$, where $\vdash$ denotes the classical logical consequence relation.

In this respect, both "classical" and intuitionistic logics are known to be explosive. Paraconsistent logic, on the other hand, is the umbrella term for logical systems where the logical consequence relation $\vdash$ is not explosive. For example, in this respect, Aristotelian syllogism is paraconsistent (Priest, 2002).

Motivation for Paraconsistency

Motivation for paraconsistency is usually this: we may be in a situation where our theory/information is inconsistent, but we still would like to make inference sensibly.
There are several class of situations where paraconsistency could be thought of a natural approach.

- Computer databases
- Scientific theories
- Law
- Counterfactuals
- Various human behavior

(Priest, 2002).

The First Semantics for Modal Logics

The history of the topological semantics of (modal) logics can be traced back to early 1920s making it the first semantics for variety of modal logics (Goldblatt, 2006). The major revival of the topological semantics of modal logics and its connections with algebras, however, is due to McKinsey and Tarski (McKinsey & Tarski, 1946; McKinsey & Tarski, 1944).

What is a Topology?

Definition

The structure $\langle S, \tau \rangle$ is called a topological space if it satisfies the following conditions.

1. $S \in \tau$ *and* $\emptyset \in \tau$
2. τ *is closed under arbitrary unions and finite intersections*

Definition

The structure $\langle S, \sigma \rangle$ is called a topological space if it satisfies the following conditions.

1. $S \in \sigma$ *and* $\emptyset \in \sigma$
2. σ *is closed under finite unions and arbitrary intersections*

What is a Topology

Collections σ and τ are called topologies.
The elements of τ are called *open* sets whereas the elements of σ are called *closed* sets. Therefore, a set is open if its complement in the same topology is a closed set and vice versa.

Functions in a Topology

Two topological spaces are called *homeomorphic* if there is function from one to the other which is a continuous bijection with a continuous inverse. Moreover, two continuous functions are called *homotopic* if there is a continuous deformation between the two.



Topological Semantics

In topological semantics, the modal operator for necessitation corresponds to the topological *interior* operator Int where $\mathsf{Int}(O)$ is the largest open set contained in O. Furthermore, one can dually associate the topological closure operator Clo with the possibility modal operator $\Diamond$ where the closure $\mathsf{Clo}(O)$ of a given set O is the smallest closed set that contains O.

Let us set a piece of notation and terminology. The extension, i.e. the points at which the formula is satisfied, of a formula φ in the model M will be denoted as $[\varphi]$.

Thus, we will have $[\Box\varphi] = \mathsf{Int}([\varphi])$.

Similarly, we will put $[\Diamond\varphi] = \mathsf{Clo}([\varphi])$.

History

Use of topological semantics for paraconsistent logic is not new. To our knowledge, the earliest work discussing the connection between inconsistency and topology goes back to Goodman (Goodman, 1981)[1].

In a recent work, Priest discussed the dual of the intuitionistic negation operator and considered that operator in topological framework (Priest, 2009). Similarly, Mortensen discussed topological seperation principles from a paraconsistent and paracomplete point of view and investigated the theories in such spaces (Mortensen, 2000). Similar approaches from modal perspective was discussed by Béziau, too (Béziau, 2005).

[1]Thanks to Chris Mortensen for pointing this work out.

How to Connect?

Recall: $[\Box\varphi] = \mathsf{Int}([\varphi])$ and $[\Diamond\varphi] = \mathsf{Clo}([\varphi])$.
Stipulate that:
extension of *any* propositional variable will be an open set, or the extension of *any* propositional variable will be an open set (Mortensen, 2000).

Problem of Negation

Negation can be difficult as the complement of an open set is not generally an open set, thus may not be the extension of a formula in the language. For this reason, we will need to use a new negation symbol $\dot{\sim}$ that returns the open complement (interior of the complement) of a given set.

A similar idea can also be applied to closed sets where we assume that the extension of any propositional variable will be a closed set. In order to be able to avoid a similar problem with the negation, we stipulate yet another negation operator which returns the closed complement (closure of the complement) of a given set. In this setting, we will the symbol $\sim$ that returns the closed complement of a given set.

Incomplete Topological Theories

Let us consider the boundary $\partial(\cdot)$ of a set X where $\partial(X)$ is defined as $\partial(X) := \mathsf{Clo}(X) - \mathsf{Int}(X)$. Consider now, for a given formuala φ, the boundary of its extension $\partial([\varphi])$ in the topology of opens τ. Let $x \in \partial([\varphi])$. Since $[\varphi]$ is open, $x \notin [\varphi]$. Similarly, $x \notin [\dot{\sim}\varphi]$ as the open complement is also open by definition. Thus, neither φ nor $\dot{\sim}\varphi$ is true at the boundary. Thus, in τ, any theory that includes the theory of the propositions that are true at the boundary is **incomplete**.

Inconsistent Topological Theories

Take $x \in \partial([\varphi])$ where $[\varphi]$ is a closed set in σ. By the above definition, since we have $x \in \partial([\varphi])$, we obtain $x \in [\varphi]$ as $[\varphi]$ is closed. Yet, $\partial[(\varphi)]$ is also included in $[\sim \varphi]$ which we have defined as a closed set. Thus, by the same reasoning, we conclude $x \in [\sim \varphi]$. Thus, $x \in [\varphi \wedge \sim \varphi]$ yielding that $x \models \varphi \wedge \sim \varphi$. Therefore, in σ, any theory that includes the boundary points is **inconsistent**.

Homeomorphism

An immediate observation yields that since extensions of all formulae in σ (respectively in τ) are closed (respectively, open), the topologies which are obtained in both paraconsistent and paracomplete logics are discrete. This observation may trivialize the matter as, for instance, discrete spaces with the same cardinality are homeomorphic.

Theorem

Let M_1 and M_2 be paraconsistent and paracomplete topological models respectively. If $|M_1| = |M_2|$, then there is a homeomorphism from a paraconsistent topological model to the paracomplete one, and vice versa.

Connectedness - 1

Definition

A formula φ is called connected if any two formulae α_1 and α_2 with non-empty extensions, if $\varphi = \alpha_1 \vee \alpha_2$, then we have $[\alpha_1 \wedge \alpha_2] \neq \emptyset$. We will call a theory T connected, if it is generated by a set of connected formulae.

Proposition

Every connected formula is satisfiable in some connected (classical) topological space.

Connectedness - 2

Proposition

Every connected theory in closed set topology σ is inconsistent. Moreover, every connected theory in open set topology τ is incomplete.

Proposition

Let X be a connected topological space of closed sets. Then, the only subtheories that are not inconsistent are the trivial ones (i.e. empty theory and X itself).

Continuity - 1

Theorem

Let $M = \langle S, \sigma, V \rangle$ and $M' = \langle S, \sigma', V' \rangle$ be two paraconsistent topological models with a homeomorphism f from $\langle S, \sigma \rangle$ to $\langle S, \sigma' \rangle$. Define $V'(p) := f(V(p))$. Then, $M \models \varphi$ iff $M' \models \varphi$ for all φ.

Note that this also works for classical logic (Kremer & Mints, 2005).

Continuity - 2

Corollary

Let $M = \langle S, \sigma, V \rangle$ *and* $M' = \langle S, \sigma', V' \rangle$ *be two paraconsistent topological models with a continuous* f *from* $\langle S, \sigma \rangle$ *to* $\langle S, \sigma' \rangle$. *Define* $V'(p) = f(V(p))$. *Then* $M \models \varphi$ *implies* $M' \models \varphi$ *for all* φ.

Corollary

Let $M = \langle S, \sigma, V \rangle$ *and* $M' = \langle S, \sigma', V' \rangle$ *be two paraconsistent topological models with an open* f *from* $\langle S, \sigma \rangle$ *to* $\langle S, \sigma' \rangle$. *Define* $V'(p) = f(V(p))$. *Then* $M' \models \varphi$ *implies* $M \models \varphi$ *for all* φ.

Continuity - 3

Recall that a *homotopy* is a description of how two continuous function from a topological space to another can be deformed to each other. We can now state the formal definition.

Definition

Let S and S' be two topological spaces with continuous functions $f, f' : S \rightarrow S'$. A homotopy between f and f' is a continuous function $H : S \times [0,1] \rightarrow S'$ such that if $s \in S$, then $H(s,0) = f(s)$ and $H(s,1) = g(s)$

In other words, a homotopy between f and f' is a family of continuous functions $H_t : S \rightarrow S'$ such that for $t \in [0,1]$ we have $H_0 = f$ and $H_1 = g$ and the map $t \rightarrow H_t$ is continuous from $[0,1]$ to the space of all continuous functions from S to S'. Notice that homotopy relation is an equivalence relation.

Continuity - 4

Define $H : S \times [0,1] \to S'$ such that if $s \in S$, then $H(s,0) = f_0(s)$ and $H(s,1) = f_1(s)$. Then, H is a homotopy. Therefore, given a (paraconsistent) topological modal model M, we generate a family of models $\{M_t\}_{t \in [0,1]}$ whose valuations are generated by homotopic functions.

Definition

Given a model $M = \langle S, \sigma, V \rangle$, we call the family of models $\{M_t = \langle S, \sigma, V_t \rangle\}_{t \in [0,1]}$ generated by homotopic functions and M homotopic models. In the generation, we put $V_t = f_t(V)$.

Theorem

Homotopic paraconsistent (paracomplete) topological models satisfy the same modal formule.

Open Questions?

- How can we logically define homotopy and cohomotopy groups in paraconsistent or paracomplete topological modal models?
- How would paraconsistency be affected under topological products?
- What is the (paraconsistent) logic of regular sets?

Future Work

- Importing more coalgebraic and algebraic tools to dynamic epistemic formalism
- Application to deontic, doxastic etc. logics
- Connection between compactness

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Thanks for your attention!

Talk slides and the paper are available at:

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